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Patricia Smith Churchland, professor emerita of philosophy at the Uni-
versity of California, San Diego, and an adjunct professor at the Salk In-
stitute, coined “neurophilosophy,” to refer to the application of neuro-
scientific concepts to traditional philosophical questions. In Braintrust:
What Neuroscience Tells Us about Morality, Churchland asks where
values come from, and incorporates biological sciences with philosophy
to answer the related moral questions.
In the first chapter, Churchland criticizes current conceptions of morality
by asking why there are still unanswered fundamental questions in the
field, including questions surrounding the nature of fairness. She be-
lieves that contemporary moral philosophy is “in peril of floating on a
sea of mere, albeit confident, opinion” (p. 2) and has no relation to the
current scientific findings in evolutionary biology and neuroscience. She
suggests that we can answer some of the remaining moral questions by
combining new findings in neuroscience, evolutionary biology, experi-
mental psychology, and genetics within a philosophical framework.
In the second chapter, Churchland emphasizes the intricate neural cir-
cuitry of the pain and reward system corresponding to the painfulness of separation and the pleasure of compa-
ny. After explaining the underlying neurobiological mechanism of attachment, she suggests that moral practices
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are rooted in social desires, most importantly in an attachment to family members, care for friends, and the
need to belong.
The third chapter deals with the question how organisms care about others. Churchland explains how the inner
state of the body is translated to the generation of motivational emotions and perceptual cues assessing the
risks and opportunities of the outside world. Here pain and fear are identified as main emotions for corrective
behaviors, as warning signals and as means of self-preservation. She then explains the neurobiology and the
mechanisms of mate attachment, parenting behavior, and the physiology of behavioral responses. She argues
that there is no need for a specific underlying mechanism to explain the neurobiology of moral behavior as “the
pain of exclusion, separation, and disapproval, […] exploits, expands, and modifies what is already in place for
physical pain and homeostatic emotions in premammalian species” (p. 46).
In the fourth chapter, Churchland focuses on the neurobiology of oxytocin and its effects on trust and caring
relationships. She claims that morality originates in the neurobiology of attachment, and so depends on the
function of the oxytocin-vasopressin network in mammals. She notes that trust between individuals has much to
do with oxytocin and vasopressin. Unfortunately, while Churchland offers detailed explanations of the relation-
ship between oxytocin in trust and cooperation (concentrating on the effect of this neurotransmitter on human
and animal behaviors), she neglects the evolutionary biological point of view, thus overlooking some very im-
portant arguments.
In the fifth chapter, Churchland explains gene-behavior relationships and how changes in genes would affect
behavior. She reminds the reader that the gene/behavior relationship is complicated and she provides different
examples and arguments to show that the gene/behavior relationship is not straightforward. In the sixth chap-
ter, she deals with the function of prefrontal cortex, which “yields the intelligence in human social behavior” (p.
119). Then she explores mirror neuron systems, the underlying neural mechanisms in attributing mental states
to others and to oneself. Although she is an optimist in explaining the neural substrate for complex social be-
haviors, she acknowledges the inability of current neuroscientific findings to explain the brain’s mechanisms
and functions. In addition, she is skeptical that the mirror neuron system alone could be responsible (and suffi-
cient) for explaining human intentions.
In the seventh chapter, Churchland explains the classical notion of morality in philosophy and highlights the
shortcomings of these notions in providing universal rules. She explores different ethical doctrines and con-
cludes that “counting on pure rationality and consistency to undergird morality is mistaken” (p. 175) as all intu-
itions are products of the brain generated in some way by nervous systems while remaining dependent on ex-
perience and cultural practices; therefore, these intuitions cannot reveal any metaphysical truths. She rejects
the idea that supernatural beings are the source of morality, as something that is good or just or right is rooted
in the nature of humans, and because, likewise, it is human nature that determines whether some social practi-
ces are better than others.
Her main thesis is that morality is based on social behaviors shaped by brain processes that include caring for
kin and kith, the ability to recognize and predict others’ mental states and intentions, our capacity to problem-
solve in a social context, and learnt social practices. Morality, to Churchland, is “a natural phenomenon—con-
strained by the forces of natural selection, rooted in neurobiology, shaped by the local ecology, and modified by
cultural developments” (p. 191). Therefore, the pain we avoid and the pleasure of belonging, along with the imi-
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tation of those we admire, “give rise to powerful intuitions about the absolute rightness or wrongness of classes
of behavior” (p. 192).
There are some shortcomings in this book that make her thesis ambiguous and the argumentation at times un-
convincing. Overall, the relationship between hormone and behavior, gene-behavior, gene-environment and the
claim that the behavior is brain-based are not novel. There is a huge body of literature on these relationships,
so it is not obvious from the content of the book what her thesis adds to this conversation. Churchland herself
confesses this, noting that “the core of the biological approach to human morality favored in this book is not
new, though my particular way of synthesizing the data and encompassing the relevant philosophical tradition
may be” (p. 11). In addition, she is unsuccessful in extending the approach to the realm of philosophy, as she
fails to offer a detailed explanation of morality from a philosophical point of view. At some points, Churchland
discusses unrelated subjects (e.g., in chapter six she goes through a detailed description of fMRI technique
function), which seem unnecessary to the overall argument, and, occasionally, paragraphs or sections lose fo-
cus. Finally, the book finishes rather suddenly, without specifically highlighting a conclusion.
Nikolaas Tinbergen, a Dutch biologist and the winner of the 1973 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine, intro-
duced four fundamental questions for an integrative explanation of behavior, that seek to, identify the function,
causation, development and evolution of behavior (Tinbergen, 1963). The proximate explanation answers how
an organism's structure functions and the ultimate question considers why a species evolved the adaptations it
has. Churchland explains the neurobiology of caring and the underlying mechanisms of social norms and be-
haviors (i.e., the how question) but she is not successful in linking evolutionary biology with morality (i.e., the
why question). In other words, she argues that the brain is responsible for all human emotions and hence mor-
ality, but she fails to explain why morality has been adaptive and why it evolved the way it did. However, there
are successful examples of evolutionary approach to morality (Baumard, 2016; Baumard, André, & Sperber,
2013).
The potential audience of this book includes those philosophers who are not familiar with neuroscience and bi-
ology, as the biological discussions in this book are classical concepts of these fields. At the same time, it
seems unlikely that a scholar with a philosophical background would find himself interested in detailed neuro-
biological arguments and discussions that are provided in this book. However, putting the criticisms aside, this
book tries to open a new perspective to the philosophers and moral researchers and could be considered a
pioneering approach in separating morality from the body of philosophy. Educated general readers interested in
the neurobiology and the underlying mechanisms of cooperation, attachment, and pair bonding might also find
the book interesting.
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